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ABSTRACT 
 The use of hypervisors for cyber operations has increased significantly over the 
past decade, resulting in an associated increase in the demand for higher-fidelity 
hypervisors. These hypervisors would not exhibit the markers, or artifacts, that expose 
the presence of the virtualized environments present in most currently available 
virtualization solutions. To address this, we present an in-depth examination of a subset 
of virtualization artifacts in order to design and implement a software solution that will 
reduce the detectability via mitigation of these artifacts. Our analysis includes performant 
measures of a bare metal machine, a virtualized machine without our mitigations, and a 
virtualized machine with our mitigations. The analysis also includes a measure of our 
implemented system's simulated sensor output. Results of the implementation are 
analyzed to determine the potential performance impact, the accuracy of our system's 
simulated output, and whether our mitigation technique is appropriate for extending 
high-fidelity hypervisors. 
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A. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
Virtualization has become a common asset in the cyber operations community. 
From malware analysis and honeypot operations to training environments for testing 
cutting-edge cyber tools and techniques, virtual machines (VMs) created and managed by 
hypervisors offer a safe and isolated environment within which to research and test new 
methods. A downside to operating within virtual machines is that they often lead to artifacts 
(or markers) that, upon discovery, may allow an observer to realize they are not operating 
on a bare metal machine. Another downside is that virtual machines do not faithfully 
replicate the full functionality of the physical computer.  
Ingraham et al. [1] described five major categories of hypervisor characteristics—
artifacts, behavior, performance, security, and functionality—that can lead to limitations 
and problems in virtualization. From his research, it is clear that these characteristics must 
be evaluated for mitigation to achieve high-fidelity virtualization. While most of these 
characteristics are a byproduct of tighter host-guest integration and proper separation 
between the host machine and the guest virtual machine, there may be a desire to hide or 
mitigate virtualization artifacts. The following describes reasons why this is true. 
First, malware analysis can greatly benefit from a high-fidelity hypervisor (HFH). 
For this research, we define an HFH as a hypervisor that is able to present a VM that 
exhibits behavior in each of the five previously discussed categories to be indistinguishable 
from a bare metal machine (i.e., a digital twin). Dinaburg et al. [2] described how “malware 
authors are incentivized to complicate attempts at understanding the internal workings of 
their creation.” These complications include techniques that can be described as anti-
debugging, anti-instrumentation, and anti-VM to frustrate would-be analysts and prevent 
deeper understanding of the malware. Indeed, Chen et al. [3] characterized the prevalence 
of evasion techniques in modern malware. According to their research, over 40% of the 
6,900 total malware samples they examined reduced their malicious behavior whenever a 
debugger was attached, or when the malware suspected it was executing within a virtual 
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machine. Artifact mitigation enables an HFH to show no signs of its virtualized 
environment, allowing analysts to more fully explore the functionality of target malware. 
Second, an organization running a honeypot would benefit greatly from an HFH. A 
virtualized environment is ideal for the execution of a honeypot, therefore malware that 
encounters such a system will likely attempt to determine if the environment is virtualized 
or not [3]. An HFH with artifact mitigation would be a better environment for honeypots 
to operate in, as they would exhibit the behaviors of a bare metal machine without any of 
the artifacts typically present in virtual machines. 
Lastly, it is essential for cyber operators to have a holistic environment in which to 
develop, test, train, and rehearse their cyber tools and techniques. From an offensive 
standpoint, it would be impractical to test certain offensive cyber operations (OCO) on a 
bare metal machine, since the results will likely damage or corrupt these test systems. 
Recovery will ultimately take time away from the cyber operators, and either reduce the 
total time spent training and testing or increase the time taken to reach a working solution. 
Neither scenario is ideal nor desirable. By offering an HFH that is able to present a system’s 
“digital twin,” it can be possible to suppress the artifacts that affect feedback to the operator 
while still providing a target environment that behaves exactly as its bare metal equivalent 
would.  
For these reasons, it is essential to examine different aspects that reduce the fidelity 
of an off-the-shelf hypervisor. In doing so, we need to design and implement mitigation 
measures that can increase the overall fidelity of hypervisors, while ensuring that the 
execution of the hypervisors and guest operating systems are not compromised.  
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
In this thesis, our research objective is to design and implement a software solution 
to increase the fidelity of hypervisors by decreasing or eliminating the likelihood of 
detecting certain virtualization artifacts. In particular, this research is focused on supporting 
user programs that rely on data generated by sensors embedded in computers, such as a 
temperature or ambient light sensor. This solution, when encountered by the user, would 
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produce simulated sensor data that would be consistent with a bare metal system’s current 
operating conditions and environment. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In our research, we investigate whether it is possible to mitigate virtualization 
artifacts in a manner that is transparent to a guest VM, while still maintaining the 
appearance of a bare-metal machine in terms of performance and artifact detectability. The 
following questions are addressed by this research: 
1. Primary Question 
What techniques can be implemented within a hypervisor to decrease detectable 
artifacts present in guest host virtual machines? 
2. Secondary Question 
How can we apply specific techniques to an open-source hypervisor to increase the 
overall fidelity of virtual machines managed by that hypervisor? 
3. Tertiary Question 
How accurately will these techniques replicate a bare metal machine’s state and 
environment during its mitigation of artifacts, and how can we measure this accuracy? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This research will benefit the Department of Defense (DOD)by offering a solution 
that will enhance the readiness and training of both offensive and defensive cyber operators 
as well as providing more appropriate testing and production environments for operations 
executed by the Cyber Warfare community.  
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into four additional chapters: background, system design 
and implementation, system testing, and conclusions and future work. 
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The next chapter provides a baseline understanding of the various virtualization 
options available to both the DOD and private industry. It defines key terminology related 
to virtualization and establishes an unambiguous set of terms and concepts as a foundation 
for this thesis. It also includes a high-level overview of the different hypervisor solutions 
available as well as the capabilities and drawbacks of each. Then, it introduces the various 
types of virtualization artifacts alongside an overview of the methods to detect these 
artifacts and potentially mitigate them. Lastly, additional software that can be useful, but 
not directly related to, our research is discussed. 
Chapter III outlines the design and implementation of a system dedicated to 
mitigating VM artifacts with no modification to the guest VM. First, a specific type of 
artifact is targeted for our system, and a testbed system is described that facilitated our 
research. Next, a specific subset of VM artifacts is targeted and our mitigation technique 
is discussed. Lastly, the technical design of our system and the artifact mitigation process 
is presented. 
Chapter IV discusses the methodology of the testing of our implemented system. 
We present our results with regards to both performance and accuracy by comparing the 
results of a bare-metal machine to a VM with no mitigation in place, as well as to a VM 
with the mitigation measures in place. We  also examine limitations to our experimentation 
as well as possible effects of those limitations. 
Finally, we present our conclusions in the final chapter, along with suggestions for 




Since any work in artifact mitigation depends on the underlying hypervisor 
implementation, it is important to explore the key concepts of hypervisors and the 
technology enabling them. The multitude of hypervisors and their unique implementations 
lends a complexity to the subject that requires a review of concepts central to hypervisors 
and virtualization. By working through the many aspects of virtualization, an appropriate 
base is set upon which work involving the mitigation of artifacts can be appropriately 
described and implemented. 
B. HYPERVISOR OVERVIEW 
The following section is a brief overview of key terminology and principles of 
hypervisors and their functionality. 
1. Terminology 
The following section introduces and explains terminology common to hypervisors 
and discussions of their functionality. 
a. Hypervisor 
Hypervisors are a specific, special form of system software designed to run virtual 
machines with low overhead. Typical hypervisors can operate on a single machine or can 
utilize cloud/distributed resources to support a large number of virtual machines that can 
be operated concurrently. For the purposes of this thesis, the hypervisor operates on a single 
machine along with any virtual machines that it is managing. Hypervisors can run at the 
layer between the hardware and operating system (Type 1), or as user-level applications 
operating in the user space of an operating system (Type 2). These distinctions are 




Virtualization is defined as “nothing more than an instance of layering for which 
the exposed abstraction is equivalent to the underlying physical resource”[4]. Furthermore, 
Singh defines it as such:  
Virtualization is a framework or methodology of dividing the resources of 
a computer into multiple execution environments, by applying one or more 
concepts or technologies such as hardware and software partitioning, time-
sharing, partial or complete machine simulation, emulation, quality of 
service, and many others. [5] 
For this thesis, virtualization is defined as the layering of execution environments such that 
no translation or cross-architectural execution between the guest system and the host 
system is required to ensure execution on the host system. 
c. Emulation 
Emulation is “a level of indirection in software to expose a virtual resource or 
device that corresponds to a physical device, even if it is not present in the current computer 
system” [4]. Emulation incurs a significant overhead cost, as the underlying execution 
environment must translate instructions from the emulated CPU architecture to instructions 
native to the host CPU architecture. This overhead is not required in a virtualized 
environment. A common example of an emulator is QEMU (Quick EMUlator), which will 
be discussed below under Type 2 hypervisors [6]. 
d. Simulation 
Simulation is typically performed in a user-level application that aims to provide a 
very accurate replica of a given architecture. While the level of accurate execution typically 
found in simulators would normally make them very desirable, they often come with a 
slowdown factor of anywhere between 5x and 1000x, depending on the level of detail in 
the simulation. This constraint makes them undesirable other than in scenarios that 
prioritize accuracy over speed and usability [4].  
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2. Technology 
The following section briefly describes the underlying technology and functionality 
found in most hypervisors. 
a. Type 1 Hypervisor 
Type 1 hypervisors operate directly between the virtualized machine and the 
hardware. Most Type 1 hypervisors operate as both the host operating system and the 
virtual machine monitor. This allows them to have full control of the host machine and its 
resources, and thus they do not need to do additional coordination of system resources with 
a host operating system. Since Type 1 hypervisors operate at the OS level, there is less 
overhead compared to operating as an application within an OS, as is the case with Type 2 
hypervisors. A few examples of Type 1 hypervisors include The Xen Project, Microsoft 
Hyper-V, and VMware vSphere. 
 
Figure 1. Type 1 Hypervisor. Source: [7]. 
b. Type 2 Hypervisor 
Type 2 hypervisors operate at the application layer, although they have full control 
of the host machine CPU during execution of the guest OS. Additional overhead is incurred 
as the host OS and hypervisor execute switches similar in nature to CPU context switches 
to achieve virtualization [4]. Some popular examples of Type 2 hypervisors include 
VMware Workstation and Fusion, QEMU with KVM, and Oracle VirtualBox. 
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Figure 2. Type 2 Hypervisor. Source: [7]. 
3. Methods of Virtualization 
a. Binary Translation 
Binary translation is a form of recompilation which “enables code written for a 
source architecture (or instruction set) to run on another destination architecture, without 
access to the original source code” [8]. The two types of binary translation are static (the 
program is translated prior to runtime) and dynamic (the program instructions are translated 
as they are read). Binary translation is generally considered difficult from an engineering 
point of view as a translator is very specialized and it may not be possible to re-target a 
given translator to a different architecture without a significant amount of extra work [8]. 
b. Full Virtualization 
Full virtualization (also referred to as hardware virtualization) is where the guest 
system is unaware of the hypervisor. Instructions that are sensitive or privileged must be 
caught by the hypervisor without causing issues or being observable inside the virtualized 
environment. Full virtualization does not require specialized instructions or device drivers 
but can inflict performance penalties since the hypervisor has to handle sensitive or 
privileged instructions without impacting the guest system. 
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c. Paravirtualization 
In paravirtualization (PV), the virtualized system is “aware” that it is running within 
a hypervisor. PV requires specialized kernels and other device drivers that take advantage 
of communication channels present between the virtual machine and the hypervisor. This 
significantly reduces the level of overhead required in full virtualization; however this is 
at the cost of requiring special PV-aware device drivers. 
C. POPULAR HYPERVISORS  
This next section describes several popular open- and closed-source hypervisors 
along with a high-level overview of their implementation approaches. 
1. Type 1 Hypervisors 
The following are various Type 1 hypervisors that are commonly found in-use in 
both commercial and personal usage. 
a. Xen (The Xen Project) 
The Xen hypervisor was introduced in 2003 in the Symposium on Operating 
System Principles (SOSP) paper “Xen and the Art of Virtualization” and is consistently 
regarded as the best example of an open-source Type 1 hypervisor. As one of the first 
hypervisors to introduce the concept of paravirtualization, Xen presents a virtualization 
solution that incurs low overhead compared to other software solutions or virtualization 
methods. The design team of Xen focused on four major design principles [9]: 
1. Running binaries without modification was essential.  
2. Supporting full-fledged modern operating systems to allow complex 
server configurations.  
3. Utilizing paravirtualization to the maximum extent to obtain the best 
performance. 
4. Masking the effects of virtualization risked correctness and performance 
of the virtual machines. 
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b. Microsoft Hyper-V 
Microsoft’s Hyper-V is a “hypervisor-based virtualization technology for certain 
x64 versions of Windows” [10]. Like Xen, Hyper-V is a Type 1 hypervisor where the 
VMM OS (currently Windows 10) coordinates and manages guest “partitions” that are 
analogous to virtual machines in other virtualization technologies. Normally, full 
virtualization is executed unless Microsoft’s proprietary “Hyper-V Integration Services” 
are installed within the guest OS, which bypasses the device emulation layer, allowing 
guests to execute as paravirtualized guests [10]. 
 
Figure 3. Microsoft Hyper-V Architecture. Source: [10]. 
c. VMware vSphere / ESXi 
ESXi is VMware’s proprietary bare-metal hypervisor, intended to be used in 
conjunction with its vSphere and vCloud products. ESXi offers VMM capabilities across 
distributed computing resources while offering a web-based user interface, along with 
various other methods of control. Although available for free with certain editions of 
VMware vSphere, it is a closed-source software solution. 
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2. Type 2 Hypervisors 
The following are Type 2 hypervisors typically found in commercial and personal 
settings. 
a. VMware Workstation 
As VMware’s proprietary single-machine Type 2 hypervisor solution, VMware 
Workstation offers multiple implementations of virtualization, including full virtualization 
with binary translation, hardware-assisted virtualization, and paravirtualization, utilizing a 
hosted (by the host operating system) hypervisor. The Workstation hypervisor runs on 
Windows host systems, while the similar VMware Fusion is designed for MacOS systems. 
The original VMware Workstation was one of the first platforms enabling x86 
virtualization in 1999 [7]. 
b. Oracle VirtualBox 
Oracle’s hypervisor solution is an open-source Type 2 hypervisor called 
VirtualBox. It relies on the hardware virtualization capabilities of the host processor 
providing either fully virtualized or paravirtualized guest systems. Guest function calls that 
cause a “VM exit” are captured by the host, processed appropriately, and then control is 
returned to the guest via “VM entry.” VirtualBox also provides multiple paravirtualization 
interfaces, depending on the guest OS, to increase overall performance while hosting 
virtual machines [11].  
c. QEMU with KVM  
The “kernel-based virtual machine” (or KVM) is a Linux kernel module that acts 
by extending a standard Linux kernel with virtualization capabilities. It accomplishes the 
task of virtualization via exposed functionality through a character device (/dev/kvm) and 
by implementing a new operating mode called “guest mode” [12]. These virtual machines 
can execute natively through a series of system calls to the KVM kernel module and run 
as individual QEMU processes on the host machine. Without this tie-in to the Linux kernel, 
QEMU acts as an emulator, as the program on its own does not have virtualization 
capabilities. 
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D. HYPERVISOR ARTIFACTS 
Virtualization artifacts are markers or indicators of the presence of a VMM or a 
guest VM. Most of these artifacts fall within one of three categories: service, process, or 
file system artifacts; random access memory artifacts; and virtualization-specific artifacts, 
which are further broken down into hardware and capability artifacts. This section will 
discuss the characteristics and differences between these categories of hypervisor artifacts. 
1. Service/Process/File System Artifacts 
Most modern hypervisors benefit from the guest OS being aware that it is 
virtualized. By utilizing paravirtualization and allowing usage of guest-hypervisor 
communication channels, the overhead usually incurred during full virtualization is 
reduced or even eliminated. But most hypervisors are also transparent about their PV-
specific drivers, which is a large source of artifacts within the guest OS. For example, a 
VMware Workstation guest running Windows XP with vmtools present (VMware’s 
proprietary PV setup) has over 50 references to “VMware” in the file system and over 300 
references in the registry [13]. Although plentiful, these references are not reliable, as 
researchers have been able to utilize techniques similar to those found in malicious rootkits 
to readily fool mechanisms looking for these types of artifacts [13]. 
2. Random Access Memory Artifacts 
The following types of artifacts are commonly grouped together as they all involve 
artifacts that can be discovered through inspection of a VM’s random access memory 
(RAM).  
a. Memory References 
Hypervisors also insert references to themselves within the guest OS’s memory, 
providing another artifact for possible detection if someone were to dump and search the 
guest’s memory. Researchers discovered over 1500 references to “VMware” within the 
memory of the guest described in the previous section [13]. It is, however, not trivial or 
feasible to discover quickly but can be made more effective if the detection mechanism 
knows which specific segments of memory need to be inspected [13]. 
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b. Pointer Examination 
Most modern operating systems utilize tables in memory that are critical to their 
operation. One example is the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), which holds pointers to 
various operating system interrupts located within memory [13]. Since the hypervisor and 
guest both must maintain their own tables, their location within memory cannot be the 
same, so tools exist (e.g., The Red Pill [14]) that examine the pointer, and determine 
whether it is operating within a virtual machine or not. 
3. Virtualization-Specific Hardware Artifacts 
The Linux OS virtual /proc directory can have a wealth of virtualization artifacts. 
Paravirtualized guests, by definition, utilize virtual device drivers designed to facilitate 
communication with the hypervisor, along with reducing latency. Within a Linux OS guest, 
there are multiple references to virtual device drivers, typically found in locations such as: 
the system’s logs, dmesg command output, and as files within virtual file directories (like 
/proc). Windows OS guests are not immune to this phenomenon as the registry also 
contains multiple device registry keys that reference the hypervisor [13]. 
4. Virtualization-Specific Capability Artifacts 
Paravirtualized guests also contain additional machine language instructions that 
extend the instruction set of the virtualized hardware. Like the PV device drivers, these 
instructions are meant to facilitate communication and performance with the hypervisor. 
VMware and Xen are both examples of hypervisors that extend the instruction set 
architecture, and tools like VMDetect are designed to attempt to run these expanded 
instructions. A tool can recognize it is operating within a virtualized environment by the 
fact that the system does not treat these expanded instructions as errors but will accept and 
continue operating gracefully [13]. 
E. HYPERVISOR DETECTION 
It is important to understand the techniques and software used to detect the 
existence of hypervisors if we hope to realize the goal of a higher-fidelity hypervisor. From 
a security standpoint, it is essential that malware not be made aware of the presence of a 
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hypervisor, since this could allow unwanted system analysis and also present a whole new 
attack surface through the VMM [15]. Analysis of these techniques and software can 
potentially open new avenues of artifact mitigation, thus coming close to realizing a 
hypervisor that is indistinguishable from a bare metal machine.  
1. Detection Techniques 
This section describes various high-level techniques that can be utilized to discover 
the presence of a hypervisor or a VM. 
a. Count-Based Detection 
At the University of Minnesota, research was conducted to quantify timing artifacts 
present within various VMMs, as compared to bare metal hardware. Thompson et al. [16] 
experimented by comparing the ratios of NOP instructions to CPUID instructions executed 
on various VMMs, discovering detectable differences in behavior that are indicative of a 
VMM. The underlying implementation utilized the fact that the CPUID instruction is 
privileged and thus adds additional latency since it must be trapped by the hypervisor and 
handled before returning control back to the guest [17]. Thompson et al. [16] discovered 
that even in cases of full virtualization like VMware Workstation, the ratio of instructions 
executed differed noticeably from the bare metal control and with a baseline understanding 
of how the system should be performing, detection of a VM is likely.  
b. Register Inspection-Based Detection 
Research by Robin and Irvine [18] found that processors must meet certain 
requirements to be considered able to support hypervisors. One of these requirements is 
that there must be a mechanism in place to automatically signal the hypervisor whenever a 
guest attempts to execute sensitive instructions. Similarly, a more specific instance of 
“sensitive instructions” includes those “that read or change sensitive registers and/or 
memory locations such as … interrupt registers” [18]. They further discovered multiple 
instructions within the Pentium instruction set that violated this rule, allowing a guest OS 
access to registers such as the Interrupt Descriptor Table Register (IDTR) which, as 
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discussed below, may allow an outside observer to recognize that they are operating within 
a virtualized environment.  
2. Detection Software 
The following are software implementations of various VM detection techniques 
that are commonly used to determine if a system is virtualized or not. 
a. Red Pill 
The Red Pill is a small 4-line program written by Rutkowska [14] that executes the 
SIDT (Store Interrupt Descriptor Table Register) machine instruction. Since a hypervisor 
and guest OS must both have an IDT, and the CPU only has a single IDTR, the hypervisor 
must store the guest’s IDTR value somewhere else in memory. The instruction itself is not 
privileged, so the guest is able to retrieve the relocated address which, regardless of the 
hypervisor present, is in a different location in memory than a bare metal machine would 
have it located [14].  
b. ScoopyNG 
ScoopyNG is a collection of tests written by Klein [19] that probe the same sort of 
artifacts that the Red Pill examines, while also attempting to run VMware-specific machine 
instructions to access the hypervisor-guest communication channel. Typically, successful 
detection of a VM by any of these tests is considered proof enough that the system is 
running in a virtualized environment [13], [19]. 
c. VMDetect 
VMDetect is another collection of tests meant to expose a hypervisor through use 
of hypervisor-specific machine instructions [13]. It works by registering its own unique 
handler for invalid OpCodes, then executes hypervisor-specific (i.e., non-standard) 
machine instructions [13]. If the unique handler is executed after an invalid machine 
instruction, then the machine in question is either virtualized using full virtualization and 
is unaware it is virtualized or is a bare metal machine. This technique is effective for both 
VMware. 
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d. Paranoid Fish 
Paranoid Fish (also known as Pafish) is a “demonstration tool that employs several 
techniques to detect sandboxes and analysis environments in the same way that malware 
does” [20]. Since it is primarily designed to ensure that analysis environments are properly 
implemented to defeat a piece of malware’s detection techniques, it is also effective at 
evaluating a virtual machine and detecting hardware and software-based artifacts that are 
present. 
F. CURRENT ARTIFACT MITIGATION SOFTWARE AND TECHNIQUES 
The following section contains a high-level overview of artifact mitigation 
techniques and software implementations of those techniques. 
1. VMmutate 
VMmutate is a proof-of-concept application that attempts to mitigate two common 
techniques for detecting a VMware hypervisor. First, it modifies the VMX configuration 
parameters in such a way that it can defeat The Red Pill and portions of the ScoopyNG test 
[15]. Second, it attempts to alter and/or disable the VMware “magic value,” which is a 
specific value loaded into a CPU register when attempting to call hypervisor-specific 
machine codes that would normally be invalid. Both modifications combined have the 
consequence of requiring modification to the hypervisor as well as the paravirtualization 
tools and drivers.  
The drawback to this software tool is that it requires an extensive search and replace 
operation within the VM disk image, which has the potential to be very large. As well, it 
is possible to encounter the “magic value” in a non-VMware context, requiring the software 
to be designed well enough to know which values to alter and which to ignore [13]. 
2. Hypervisor Configuration Modification 
A mitigation technique is the modification of configuration files within the 
hypervisor to remove artifacts either through obscuration or the breakage of the hypervisor-
guest communication channel. For example, Liston and Skoudis [13] discovered several 
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undocumented configuration options that, when set a certain way, broke the hypervisor-
guest communication channel, rendering the hypervisor undetectable through The Red Pill 
or ScoopyNG. The drawback to this technique is that these modifications are neither 
documented nor officially supported, thus there is no guarantee that these mitigation 
techniques will remain effective given that future updates can often break undocumented 
features [15].  
G. OTHER RELATED WORK 
Although not designed for detection mitigation, there are software libraries and 
software tools that were originally intended to examine virtual machines and aid in their 
analysis, but that could also be used as a means of obfuscating nontrivial artifacts within 
the guest system or the hypervisor. An example of this might be artifacts present in the 
Linux /proc virtual filesystem. Since any mitigation technique implemented within the 
guest system could be classified as an artifact, by virtue of its presence within the guest 
filesystem, it is also worthwhile to examine solutions that are employed from outside the 
virtual machine. 
1. LibVMI 
LibVMI is an offshoot of the XenAccess Project, which is meant to be a means of 
virtual machine introspection focused on Xen hypervisors. Specifically, LibVMI aims to 
be less platform dependent and able to support multiple different hypervisor solutions. It 
provides a means of monitoring (by reading memory values) and control (by writing new 
values to memory) from outside the guest virtual machine and is thus able to remain 
undetected from the perspective of the guest system [21]. 
2. DRAKVUF 
DRAKVUF is an “agentless black-box binary analysis system” designed to utilize 
LibVMI and the Xen hypervisor to monitor and trace binary execution of a virtual machine 
from outside the guest itself [22]. It is traditionally used for stealthy malware analysis, but 
also has the ability to trap specific system calls, giving it the potential for arbitrary 
data/process injection in Windows guest systems. DRAKVUF also utilizes a plugin-based 
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system that is much less complicated to utilize, as compared to modifying a hypervisor’s 
source code directly. DRAKVUF currently requires the use of Intel x86 processors to 
leverage virtualization technology present, but there has also been initial development of 
an ARM-based version [23]. 
H. SUMMARY 
As the survey of hypervisor technology shows, many different hypervisors are 
available for implementation, some potentially along the path toward a high-fidelity 
hypervisor. These hypervisors are designed to operate either directly above the hardware 
level or as applications within another operating system. The guest systems may also be 
operated at different “levels” of virtualization, ranging from fully translated hosts that are 
completely unaware of the hypervisor to paravirtualized hosts that are able to capitalize on 
communication channels and achieve near-native speed and latency. However, all these 
implementations create virtualization artifacts, which must be mitigated to prevent 
identification of virtualization. Although detection techniques have evolved and become 
better over the last fifteen to twenty years, our goal is to implement techniques that are able 
to avoid detection by commonly employed hypervisor detection programs. 
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III. SYSTEM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
In this chapter, we discuss the detailed design of the system for this research, 
focusing on the rationale behind specific design choices as well as assumptions made. 
A. OVERVIEW 
In our research, we have decided to extend the Xen hypervisor that leverages 
DRAKVUF and LibVMI’s introspection abilities to create a plugin named smokescreen. 
Smokescreen works by mitigating device and capability-specific virtualization artifacts 
present in a VM. It does so by performing introspection on each system call that attempts 
to execute a program and, if smokescreen matches a pre-determined list of artifact-
exposing binaries, it replaces the path and redirects the system to execute a modified 
version of the program to obscure the VM artifact. This obscuration is achieved by having 
the modified program present seemingly legitimate output in the same fashion as the 
unmodified program. Since all calls to execute programs are monitored, any calls that do 
not require redirection are immediately released back to VM execution to minimize 
performance penalties within the system, which may themselves indicate the existence of 
a virtual environment.  
B. HOST SYSTEM 
One of the more important decisions made during our research was the 
configuration of the test system. Both the hypervisor and the guest system were configured 
to be representative of a majority of different configurations found on web servers utilized 
within the last decade.  
According to W3Techs, the majority of web servers have operated utilizing some 
form of Unix-based operating system, with a  further breakdown showing that the Ubuntu 
OS (a Debian-based derivative) was the most likely Linux operating system used [24]. We 
elected to utilize Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS since this version continues to enjoy long term 
support via its owner, Canonical, so it is likely to be encountered “in the wild” quite often. 
The fact that the DRAKVUF/Xen combination has been tested and confirmed to work on 
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Ubuntu-based installations reinforced our decision to utilize Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS as both 
the Hypervisor (to ensure compatibility with DRAKVUF and Xen) and the guest OS (to 
ensure a representative system). As far as the guest system was concerned, the only 
modification required to ensure correct smokescreen execution was that any modified 
binary must reside within the guest OS due to current limitations of the DRAKVUF system. 
C. HYPERVISOR 
We utilize a Type-1 hypervisor for our system since they are more typical in 
commercial settings compared to the application-based Type-2 hypervisor. The Xen 
hypervisor was chosen due to its open-source nature and the fact that it is widely adopted 
as a hypervisor solution in the tech sector. Additionally, since DRAKVUF and LibVMI 
were originally designed to work in conjunction with the Xen hypervisor, we were able to 
leverage that inherent compatibility to achieve a stable platform for our research. 
D. DRAKVUF 
According to the author and maintainer of the DRAKVUF software suite, it is a 
“virtualization based agentless black-box binary analysis system” [23]. A key feature of 
DRAKVUF is its ability to examine and manipulate the execution of arbitrary binaries 
within a guest operating system without having to install any additional analysis software 
within the VM. Our end goal, the mitigation of device and capability-based artifacts, was 
achieved through three separate components found within the DRAKVUF system. 
1. Rekall 
Rekall is an open-source Python-based framework utilized for “the extraction and 
analysis of digital artifacts (in) computer systems” [25]. It works by analyzing the currently 
running kernel on the system to determine the kernel configuration as well as the kernel 
source headers to map out the locations of essential kernel structures and outputs the 
locations of these structures as a standardized JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) file. This 
tailored profile contains key information such as the base memory address of the kernel 
structure, as well as important address offsets of kernel memory objects and, most 
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importantly, system call locations. Armed with these memory locations, DRAKVUF is 
able to leverage LibVMI to trap these system calls. 
2. LibVMI 
LibVMI is a critical component of DRAKVUF that enables the implementation of 
Virtual Machine Introspection, specifically allowing access to a live (i.e., running) VM 
through physical or virtual memory addresses and kernel symbols. The Rekall profile 
allows LibVMI to “bypass the use (of) the in-memory KdDebuggerData (KDBG) structure 
normally used by memory forensics tools and thus allows introspecting domains where this 
structure is either corrupted or encoded (like in the case of Windows 8 x64)” [21]. For our 
research, LibVMI is the primary means of ensuring that the specific system calls we desire 
to intercept are correctly identified, located, and properly trapped. We then analyze these 
system calls and, if modification is determined to be necessary, modify the appropriate 
parameters. This ensures that any artifact-exposing binaries will be properly intercepted 
and mitigated through redirection to our modified binaries. 
3. Plugin System 
DRAKVUF’s last essential component to our research involves the powerful plugin 
system implemented as part of the analysis suite. Through a minor modification of 
DRAKVUF’s source files, we were able to build and integrate various plugins that are 
initialized and executed during DRAKVUF’s main program loop. These plugins are 
written in C/C++ and utilize a callback function to perform introspection and modification 
of VMs while they are running. At DRAKVUF initialization these plugins are initialized 
as well, and the various callback functions are registered to be executed whenever the 
program’s main loop determines it to be appropriate. In the case of our research, these 
callbacks were configured (via a command-line interface with DRAKVUF) to be executed 
whenever the desired system calls are executed within the guest operating system’s kernel.    
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E. PLUGIN IMPLEMENTATION 
The following section describes the components and implementation of 
smokescreen. We present the hardware and software components followed by a detailed 
description of the plugin implementation and other implemented software components. 
1. Hardware Component Emulation 
One particularly interesting application of our research into mitigating device and 
capability artifacts is the mitigation of artifacts that arise from a VM not having direct 
access to the host hardware devices (as shown with VM1 in Figure 4). In most cases, these 
devices are emulated by the hypervisor to provide a seamless experience to the user, but 
that is not always the case. For example, most VMs do not have the ability to query physical 
data such as CPU temperature, or other less often encountered sensors (such as light sensors 
or motion detectors) that even when present on the host system may not be exposed to the 
guest system.  
 
Figure 4. HVM I/O Support. Source [26]. 
We chose to implement a CPU temperature sensor since it is almost universally 
found on modern processors but is typically not exposed to guest VMs. To do this, we 
examined the datasheets of the specific processor used as our testbed (an Intel Core i7-
6700) to determine if a temperature model could be ascertained. Upon inspection of the 
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processor specifications [27], we noted references to the TCASE of the processor. Further 
inspection of the processor datasheet [28] showed that TCASE corresponds to “Case 
Temperature [which] is the maximum temperature allowed at the processor Integrated Heat 
Spreader (IHS)” [27]. It is typically used by designers of cooling systems to ensure that 
their products are working safely. As shown in Figure 5 of the technical datasheet, the 
thermal profile is a linear model. 
 
Figure 5. Thermal Test Vehicle Thermal Profile for PCG 2015C Processor 
(Intel Core i7-6700). Source [27]. 
From this linear model, we were able to calculate a reasonable CPU temperature 
profile, based solely on the processor utilization of the guest machine. 
2. Software Component 
Our system’s software component is based on a widely utilized Linux program 
called sensors, from the set of software tools known as lm-sensors [29]. As shown in Figure 
6, this program works through the examination of system files found in a system’s virtual 
file systems (i.e., /proc or /sys). These files contain raw sensor output for various types of 
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sensors including, but not limited to, temperature sensors. The program collects the data 
from these sensors, formats it to be human readable, and then outputs it for the user to 
examine. A VM that does not have access to the underlying system’s sensors will report 
an error condition upon execution of the sensors binary since, from the VM’s perspective, 
the sensors do not exist. However, most modern CPUs have a temperature reporting sensor 
implemented, as it is an essential piece of the architecture’s thermal management 
processes. This lack of reporting on the part of the VM presents itself as both a device and 
a capability artifact of virtualization.  
  
Figure 6. General Execution Flow of sensors Binary. 
Therefore, we decided to implement a modified version of the sensors binary that 
could report temperature to the end user, as shown in Figure 7. While this could be 
accomplished simply by having the modified binary output a static value, the goal of 
implementing a HFH means that the output value should reasonably reflect the current state 
of the apparent bare metal machine and its environment, even in the context of it being a 
VM and environment.  
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Figure 7. Modified sensors Execution Flow. 
To this end, our goal was to implement a subroutine or library that, when executed, 
would sample current conditions within the VM and use those conditions to execute a 
lookup from the linear temperature model, given system utilization (in watts). To do this, 
we utilized the TCASE model published by the processor manufacturer, along with the 
current utilization of the system as determined by the contents of the /proc/loadavg system 
file. This system file is common to Linux operating systems, and reports running 1-, 5-, 
and 10-minute processor load averages of the system as floating-point numbers between 
0.0 and 1.0 per CPU core/thread (for example, a single core operating at 75% will report a 
value of 0.75). As shown in Figure 8, by using the 1-minute average as an approximation 
of current system utilization and the 5- and 10-minute averages to influence the “effect” of 
cooling solutions (for instance, when longer-term utilization is higher, it is likely that 
cooling fans have also been working to manage temperature for some amount of time), we 
were able to implement a simple lookup function that scaled appropriately with system 
utilization.   
 
result = 45.6 + ((POWER*one_min_avg)*0.41); 
result -= ((1.0-five_min_avg) + ((1.0-ten_min_avg)*10)); 
Figure 8. C Implementation of the Modeling Function. 
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3. Means of Implementation 
Smokescreen was developed as a plugin for DRAKVUF, primarily implemented 
in C/C++. DRAKVUF and the parent plugin class are implemented in this language so that 
extension of the class is easier in the same language. For the actions taken by smokescreen 
during execution, knowledge of Sysv 64-bit calling conventions was also required, as 
memory and register introspection/manipulation require knowledge of CPU registers and 
their contents prior to kernel system calls. 
The plugin itself was implemented as an extension of the plugin class (per 
DRAKVUF requirements) and consists of a total of seven files. Two of the files contain 
the plugin implementation itself, and one is a header file containing our temperature 
calculation function. The third file is a patch file for the source files for sensors. The fourth 
and fifth files describe the system calls and executable paths to be trapped and modified, 
and finally the modified (i.e., recompiled) version of sensors.  
The plugin files are found in src/plugins/smokescreen and consist of 
smokescreen.cpp and smokescreen.h per plugin specification. The temperature lookup 
function consists of a single file temp_lib.h and is required to be in the sensors/lib folder 
of the lm-sensors source code to ensure proper recompilation of the sensors binary. The 
patch file must be applied to sensors/prog/sensors/main.c of the lm-sensors source code 
prior to compilation to ensure that our temperature function is called, and to prevent 
leakage of VM artifacts when the modified sensors binary is executed. The system call list 
is passed as a command line argument to drakvuf (via the -S flag) which expects an absolute 
or relative path and can be located wherever the end user desired, and the binary list must 
be located at /home/xen/xen/binary_list.txt, but that location is modifiable if required. 
Finally, the modified sensors binary must be located on the guest VM at /fake/usr/bin/, 
but this location is completely modifiable within the source code for smokescreen. 
For the implementation of smokescreen, the Linux system call execve() requires 
three parameters: a pointer to the fully qualified path name as a string, a pointer to an 
argument vector, and a pointer to an environmental variable vector. According to AMD64 
Sysv calling conventions, these parameters are found in the CPU registers RDI, RSI, and 
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RDX, respectively. For our research, the argument and environmental variable vectors are 
not modified at any time nor require modification for smokescreen to execute. Since 
modification of the argument vector (i.e., the command line arguments) would likely 
expose our modifications, it is best to leave it untouched as this will ensure that our 
modified version will preserve functionality not directly related to our emulated sensor 
such as printing a help or version message. The environmental variable vector is not used 
directly by the sensors program, and modification may lead to system instability.     
Our plugin follows a simple execution flow, shown in Figure 9, whenever the 
callback function is invoked, as described in the following steps: 
1. Retrieve and lock (pause) the instance of the VM being monitored. 
2. Identify the pathname of the binary about to be executed through 
introspection. 
3. Compare the pathname to a predefined list of fully qualified pathnames to 
original binaries that contain virtualization artifacts. 
4. Extract the pathname if a match is found and modify it to be the fully 
qualified path of our modified binary. If not a match, execution will be 
resumed with no modifications made. 
5. Release (un-pause) the VM and allow execution to resume. 
We provide further detail on this execution flow in the following.  
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Figure 9. Smokescreen Execution Flow 
During step 1, the VM instance allows access to, among other things, the values 
stored within individual CPU registers along with both physical and virtual memory 
addresses. Since we are concerned with the Linux kernel’s execve() call, we must be able 
to extract the pathname from the VM’s RDI register for the calling process. As 
DRAKVUF/LibVMI traps these calls, smokescreen’s callback function is able to query 
LibVMI for a vmi_instance_t struct named vmi. With this struct, in conjunction with the 
drakvuf_trap_info_t struct that is passed to the callback function as a parameter, we are 
able to extract information from the VM’s memory to accomplish our introspection. This 
extracted information includes data such as the calling process PID (Process Identification) 
and a complete snapshot of CPU registers and their values for the calling process. When 
the system call is invoked, RDI contains a pointer to a string representation of the file path 
to be executed.  
As shown in Figure 10, we executed step 2 of our process by utilizing LibVMI’s 
function vmi_read_str_va() which returns a pointer to the string containing the fully 




vmi = drakvuf_lock_and_get_vmi(drakvuf); 
pathname = vmi_read_str_va(vmi, info->regs->rdi, info->proc_data.pid); 
 
if (pathname == NULL) { 
   drakvuf_release_vmi(drakvuf); 
   fprintf(stderr, “[Warning] Captured NULL pathname.\n”); 
   return 0; 
} 
Figure 10. Code to Lock the VM and Extract Pathname 
Next, as shown in Figure 11, we execute step 3 by comparing our captured 
pathname and comparing it to our list of pathnames to be intercepted. The list of binaries 
is loaded at initialization of the plugin and resides outside of the VM.  
 
bool found = false; 
for (int i = 0; I < s->binaries.size(); i++) { 
   printf(“Comparing %s with %s.\n,” s->binaries [i].c_str(), pathname); 
   if (s->binaries [i].compare(pathname) == 0) { 
       found = true; 
       break; 
   } 
} 
if (!found) { 
   drakvuf_release_vmi(drakvuf); 
   fprintf(stderr, “[Info] No match found.\n”); 
   return 0; 
} 
Figure 11. Code to Find a Pathname Match. 
If a matching pathname is found, step 4 is executed by constructing a modified 
pathname and writing it back to the original memory location that still resides in the VM’s 
RDI register. Otherwise, we immediately release the lock on the VM and return, allowing 
execution to resume. 
From there, the final step is executed by releasing the VM instance, allowing 
execution to continue in the VM. From the perspective of the executing VM, it is unlikely 
that this process will be observed unless the user is meticulously monitoring execution of 
the system in real time.  
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fakepath = (char*) malloc(sizeof(char)*4096); 
strcpy(fakepath, “/fake”); 
strcat(fakepath, pathname); 
printf(“smokescreen attempting to change path to… %s.\n,” fakepath); 
vmi_write_va(vmi, info->regs->rdi, info->proc_data.pid,  
strlen(fakepath)+1, fakepath, c); 
free(fakepath); 
Figure 12. Code to Modify Pathname. 
F. SUMMARY 
In conclusion, we have designed a system that can obfuscate virtualization device 
and capability artifacts, with minimal impact to the guest VM. By placing modified binaries 
that mitigate artifacts on our guest VM alongside utilizing VM introspection and 
DRAKVUF on the hypervisor, we can redirect execution and obfuscate the presence of the 
modified binaries, as the guest VM believes it is executing the original files. Therefore, 
even if an interested party were to examine the original files that are still present, there 
would be no outward or obvious indications that they were not the files being executed. 
Although the modified binaries are present on the guest VM (thus introducing additional 
virtualization artifacts), there is no requirement that the modified binaries follow any sort 
of naming convention which can further obfuscate their presence on the guest VM.  




IV. SYSTEM TESTING 
In this chapter, we present and discuss our methodology for performance and 
accuracy testing of our system, followed by analysis of their results. 
A. TESTING METHODOLOGY 
In order to test our system’s ability to achieve artifact mitigation, we needed to 
examine the detectability of VM introspection when redirecting guest VM execution, as 
well as the accuracy of our sensor data lookup function compared to the bare metal sensor 
output. We achieved each of these by executing two tests.  
1. Performance Testing 
First, we tested the performance of our system by examining our modified sensors 
program in three environments: a bare metal machine, a VM where no introspection 
occurred, and a VM where introspection did occur. Within each environment, we extracted 
the following data, respectively: the average runtime of sensors, the performance overhead 
of virtualization alone, and the performance overhead of smokescreen and its VM 
introspection. The performance test was considered successful if the introspected VM in 
our system executed with runtimes similar to those of the other two environments. 
To measure the timing of our three environments, we created a Python script to 
perform multiple system calls that execute sensors, both modified and unmodified. For 
each execution, the individual runtime was calculated and stored. After all test iterations 
were completed, statistics were extracted from each environment and analysis was 
conducted to calculate average runtime, standard deviation, and 95% confidence interval 
for the average. For the purposes of our research, negative timing results were considered 
invalid and discarded to prevent data skew. 
2. Accuracy Testing 
We tested the accuracy of our temperature lookup function by building a program 
that would output our estimate alongside the actual sensor data (i.e., the truth value). More 
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specifically, we compared the results of our lookup function to the output of the CPU 
temperature sensor within the /sys filesystem. Success was indicated if the lookup function 
produced similar values to the actual temperatures measured while conducting our test. 
To measure the values, we created a C program that executed the lookup function 
then read the actual sensor output. Both values were then redirected to an output collection 
file. Since our goal is to provide an accurate estimation for the entire range of utilization, 
we wanted to ensure the widest range of possible values were passed to the lookup function. 
To accomplish this, NOP loops were executed concurrently with our test program to drive 
up CPU utilization, simulating the transition from idle to full utilization. The test then 
halted operations to capture the ramp down to system idle. After testing was complete, the 
utilization amounts (i.e., output of /proc/loadavg), estimated temperature (from our 
function), and actual temperature (from the sensors) were extracted and analyzed to 
calculate the average deviation between the estimated values and the actual values, both as 
a raw value (degrees Celsius) and percentage. 
B. PERFORMANCE TESTING 
In testing the performance of our system, we found it necessary to compare it to 
both a bare metal machine and a non-introspected VM. With the bare metal machine, we 
were able to establish a baseline performance, and by including a non-introspected VM, 
we were then able to determine how much impact from our system could be attributed to 
virtualization overhead. With these two additional pieces of data, we were able to 
accurately measure the cost of smokescreen in terms of performance.  
1. Bare Metal Machine 
Our bare metal machine was configured to utilize the same hardware configuration 
and the same Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS distribution that were used for the virtual machine. Lm-
sensors was installed and executed with no modification to the sensors program. Several 
sensors, including the processor temperature sensor, were detected out-of-the-box (i.e., 
without additional configuration required).  
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In testing the bare metal machine, as the results show in Table 1, we were able to 
establish that sensors executed for an average of 2.886ms, with most values falling within 
0.5ms of that time. Based on the number of iterations executed, we were able to establish 
a 95% confidence interval of +/-0.00986ms, making us very sure about the accuracy of our 
average execution time. 
Table 1. Bare Metal Timing Results. 
Total Iterations 9,944 
Average Execution Time 2.886ms 
Standard Deviation 0.5ms 
95% Confidence Interval +/- 0.00986ms 
 
2. Hypervisor without Mitigations Present 
To establish the cost of hypervisor overhead, we needed to measure the 
performance difference between an introspected and a non-introspected VM. To do this, 
we used the Dom0 VM, which is the VM that acts as our user interface to the Xen 
hypervisor directly (i.e., the environment that DRAKVUF runs in while introspecting a 
guest VM). We chose the Dom0 VM, as opposed to our guest VM, for two reasons: first, 
the Dom0 VM is defined by the Xen hypervisor as being another virtual machine that has 
elevated access to the hardware level, which is not available in the guest VM [9]. Although 
the Dom0 VM does not have access to the CPU temperature sensor, it does have access to 
other sensors (which our guest host does not) and it still provides a similar flow of 
execution for the unmodified sensors program when compared to the bare metal machine. 
Second, our test system was designed intentionally to ensure that the VMM and the guest 
VM were executing identically-configured kernels, and that both had access to similar 
resources through the hypervisor, providing a nearly identical environment when compared 
to the guest VM.  
The performance of this test system is shown in Table 2. We see that execution 
time increased by approximately 1.2ms on average over the bare metal system, and resulted 
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in a wider standard deviation. Due to the increased standard deviation, our 95% confidence 
interval with regards to execution time increased to +/-0.01425ms. 
Table 2. Virtual Machine Timing (No Introspection) Results. 
Total Iterations 9,953 
Average Execution Time 4.022ms 
Standard Deviation 0.73ms 
95% Confidence Interval +/- 0.01425ms 
 
3. Hypervisor with Mitigations Present 
Finally, the guest VM was tested with DRAKVUF running on the hypervisor, with 
smokescreen implemented and executing as a part of the DRAKVUF instance. The guest 
VM also executed the modified version of sensors. As shown in Table 3, execution times 
for this system increased by a relatively large amount over the other test systems, with 
average execution time increasing by 5.964ms over the bare metal system, and by 4.828ms 
over the non-introspection system. In addition, this performance resulted in a wider range 
of observed execution times, as seen by the higher standard deviation of 1.493ms. Here we 
experienced the widest of our 95% confidence intervals, with a value of +/-0.04816ms. 
Although this is significantly larger of an interval compared to the other two environments, 
it still shows that we can reasonably expect execution to fall within a small range of 
possible times. 
Table 3. Virtual Machine Timing (with Introspection) Results. 
Total Iterations 9,959 
Average Execution Time 8.850ms 
Standard Deviation 1.493ms 
95% Confidence Interval +/- 0.04816ms 
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C. ACCURACY TESTING 
Another important metric in determining success in our system is whether our 
temperature function accurately reflects the bare metal system’s state without direct access 
to the sensors. To test this, we compared our lookup function output to the bare metal 
system’s temperature sensor raw output, as stored in the /sys folder (in Ubuntu 16.04.6 
LTS). The results are broken down into three categories as shown in Table 4. Overall, we 
saw consistent underestimation, with our lookup function typically returning values around 
13°C, or 16.28%, lower than the raw sensor values. By also considering the calculated 
standard deviation of the differences, most estimation differences were anywhere between 
-22.3917°C and -4.0739°C too low. When broken down by utilization transition, the idle 
to full transition saw much larger underestimations up to 35°C with an average difference 
of 21.9% between the estimated and actual values. Underestimations seen here typically 
fell within a range of -20.503°C and -11.799°C. The full to idle transition saw both under 
and overestimations with deviations between -15°C and +17°C, but an average difference 
of only 0.52% and most differences falling within between -3.4256°C and +2.7884°C. 
Table 4. Lookup Function Accuracy Results. 
Overall Results (3600 data points) 
Average Difference -13.2328°C 
Standard Deviation 9.1589°C 
Average Difference Percentage -16.28% 
Largest Underestimation -35.000°C 
Largest Overestimation 17.000°C 
Idle to Full Utilization Transition (2403 data points) 
Average Difference -17.8244°C 
Standard Deviation 4.3521°C 
Average Difference Percentage -21.94% 
Largest Underestimation -35.000°C 
Largest Overestimation N/A* 
Full to Idle Utilization Transition (1196 data points) 
Average Difference -0.3186°C 
Standard Deviation 3.1070°C 
Average Difference Percentage 0.51% 
Largest Underestimation -15.000°C 
Largest Overestimation 17.000°C 
*No overestimations occurred. 
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D. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
In this section, we analyze the results of the performance and accuracy testing, and 
present possible explanations of these results. 
1. Performance Analysis 
Initial examination of the performance statistics shows that there is a measurable 
impact of both virtualization and VM introspection. A histogram of the three test systems’ 
execution times is shown in Figure 13. In Table 2 we saw an increase of ~1.1ms average 
execution time (from 2.886ms to 4.022ms), a roughly 39% increase, in a virtual machine 
over a bare metal machine. We also saw an increase in the range of values encountered 
within one standard deviation. It is possible that this increase in execution time was due to 
resource sharing between the various VMs as well as context switching (for example, due 
to sensitive or privileged instructions that much be trapped) between the hypervisor and 
guest VM that is required for normal virtualization operations. 
 
Figure 13. System Performance Results. 
Comparing the results of the guest VM alongside smokescreen operating, we saw 
a relatively large increase in the execution time for sensors. The average execution time 
was 8.850ms with a standard deviation of 1.493ms. This difference in timing compared to 
the bare metal system can likely be attributed to not only the overhead incurred by 
virtualization, but also to the processing time of smokescreen and the lookup function 
executed by sensors. Since the results from the previous two environments show that 
sensors takes approximately 2.886ms to execute, and virtualization overhead added an 
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additional 1.136ms, then the 8.850ms execution time we observed shows that smokescreen 
increased average execution time by 4.828ms compared to an unmodified VM and 
increased by 5.964ms compared to a bare metal system. These times correspond to a 
roughly 83% and 206% increase in average execution time compared to the non-
introspected VM and the bare metal machine respectively.  
2. Accuracy Analysis 
In comparing our lookup function to the actual sensors on the bare metal system, 
our modelling function followed the overall trend of the actual sensor data. As temperature 
sensor readings increased, our function returned steadily increasing results, and when the 
actual temperature decreased, our function also showed a decrease in returned values.  
Although our function produced a similar temperature curve to that of the actual 
sensor data, it consistently underestimated the actual temperature values, as can be seen in 
Figure 14. This was likely due to a combination of the use of the TCASE temperature as an 
upper limit to calculatable temperatures, along with the influence of the five- and ten-
minute averages on the calculated value. Although TCASE is described by Intel as “the 
maximum temperature at the integrated heat spreader” [27], it should not be considered an 
upper limit to temperatures that could be encountered in reality. Next, the intention of the 
five- and ten-minute averages was to estimate the effect of CPU cooling over time, but as 
average CPU utilization grew and plateaued, those averages capped the estimated 
temperature even lower than TCASE (71° C in the case of our Intel i7-6700). 
 
Figure 14. System Accuracy Results. 
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E. TESTING LIMITATIONS 
The version of DRAKVUF that we used limited introspected VMs to a single 
virtual CPU per VM (which is assigned to a single physical CPU thread by the hypervisor). 
Additionally, the output of /proc/loadavg is a combined total of the load average for all 
present CPU threads, so a 4-core/8-thread CPU (such as the Intel i7-6700) would return 
values ranging from 0.00 to 8.00 (i.e. 0% to 800%) to signify no utilization on any core to 
full utilization on all cores, respectively. Since our design assumed access to only a single 
CPU thread from the start, it did not account for the presence of multiple cores or multiple 
threads. However, our temperature accuracy testing was performed on a bare metal 
machine that had access to all eight processor threads in order to have actual sensor data. 
To account for this, we modified our temperature lookup function for testing as follows: 
1. Multiple NOP loops were utilized to ensure 100% utilization across all 
CPU threads. 
2. The /proc/loadavg output was normalized to a range of 0.0 to 1.0, 
producing values that would be expected by smokescreen. 
By ensuring that all CPU threads were operating at near-identical utilization, and 
by normalizing the load averages to that of a single core processor, we were able to produce 
the range of values that smokescreen would expect and would accurately reflect the results 
produced by the plugin. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we presented the testing methodology and results of our 
implemented system, smokescreen. From a performance point of view, the introduction of 
our system onto a VM resulted in an average execution time increase of 5.964ms, 
representing a 206% increase over a baseline bare metal machine. Of that time, 38% of the 
increase can likely be attributed to the virtualization overhead, and an increase of 167% 
that can be attributed to smokescreen.  
From an accuracy point of view, our smokescreen system closely followed the 
temperature curve of the bare metal machine sensor data, however our lookup function 
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consistently underestimated the CPU temperature. This was likely because of the use of 
TCASE as a maximum temperature value combined with the usage of higher utilization over 
time (the five- and ten-minute load averages) acting to further depress on our estimated 
values.  
In the next chapter, we present our conclusions as well as recommendations for 
future work in VM artifact mitigation.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
At the beginning of our research, we set out to answer three important research 
questions. We sought to 1) identify techniques utilized to mitigate hypervisor artifacts, 2) 
design and implement chosen techniques that would mitigate these artifacts, and 3) ensure 
that our mitigations could accurately estimate the actual state of the underlying system, 
without access to the sensors that describe that state. Our mitigation tool, smokescreen, 
answers these questions, providing artifact mitigation with a performance cost measured 
in milliseconds, while being able to provide sensor data that follows the temperature curve 
of a bare metal system during normal use.  
In this chapter, we present our conclusions as well as recommendations for follow-
on research and other future work. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis we designed and implemented smokescreen as a DRAKVUF plugin 
with the goal of mitigating capability and device artifacts common within modern VMs. In 
particular, we were able to modify a VM’s system calls to replace the path of specific 
programs which produce virtualization artifacts and replace them with modified versions 
that did not exhibit those artifacts. The artifacts are mitigated by having the modified 
program estimate the system’s state through use of other system information that is present. 
Although other solutions exist that also provide increased fidelity [30], our goal was to 
implement a solution that existed mostly outside the guest VM in order to achieve our view 
of a high-fidelity hypervisor. Our results indicated that smokescreen provides increased 
fidelity but at the expense of increased execution times and potentially introducing other 
VM artifacts in order to mitigate those we targeted in our system.  
1. Artifact Mitigation 
By utilizing DRAKVUF [22], we were able to keep most of our software solution 
outside of the guest VM. The implementation showed that it is possible to redirect 
execution of some artifact-leaking programs in a way that is difficult to detect, even when 
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examining execution from within the VM. This results from the fact that the guest VM has 
no potential indicators that the original program is not being executed. 
However, smokescreen’s implementation and its interactions with LibVMI’s API 
started to make the limitations of VM introspection more apparent. Through smokescreen 
we were able to access CPU register and memory contents, but the plugin could not directly 
access devices or files in order to modify them. As a result of this, our implementation 
needed to introduce additional file system artifacts into the guest VM. Since our 
modifications to the guest VM were limited to data in or pointed at by CPU registers, we 
were unable to directly manipulate the programs which cause artifact leakage and must 
instead redirect execution to our own modified versions of the programs which reside 
within the guest VM to mitigate potential leakage. Similarly, since we were unable to 
manipulate the system files that contain sensor values, we were forced to ensure that our 
modified programs also calculated the estimated value inside the guest VM rather than 
doing so from without and passing that data to the original program. 
2. Performance 
Overall impact to performance is an important consideration when determining 
whether smokescreen would be an appropriate building block for an HFH. Our solution’s 
cost to performance is a 206% increase in the execution time of the sensors program. 
However, when considered in terms of the actual amount of time to run (roughly 3ms to 
9ms), the actual execution time would be unlikely to raise suspicions of the presence of a 
hypervisor, as that difference could easily be attributed to other causes, such as resource 
sharing among processes, context switches, or other high-priority processes preempting 
these programs during execution. However, as the number of VMs present on a machine 
increase (increasing the demand on system resources) or as the number of programs that 
require redirection increase, it is possible that the introspections could cause a more 
noticeable system slowdown over time. This could be a limiting factor for deployment of 
our solution.  
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3. Accuracy 
The accuracy of our system is also an important consideration for deployment 
within an HFH. Overall, our solution was able to generally follow the temperature curve 
of the actual CPU temperature, but typically underestimated the values by around 16°C on 
average. However, when examined by the utilization trend (idle to full and full to idle), it 
was seen that almost all of the significant underestimations occurred during the idle to full 
transition, with the estimations staying relatively close (within 3°C on average) during the 
full to idle transition. With additional research, a more representative linear model can be 
created and applied, resulting in a temperature curve that not only follows the correct 
temperature curve, but is also more accurate in its estimations. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
During our research and implementation of smokescreen, we encountered a few 
teachable moments. First, implementation of a system that operates outside a guest VM but 
affects operation within that VM can be problematic. DRAKVUF and LibVMI are able to 
make access to CPU registers and memory contents possible, but only when system calls 
are executed. From a semantic point of view, we were required to bridge the gap between 
the high-level execve() call and the low-level view presented during introspection. Intimate 
knowledge of assembly code and the relationship between a process’s virtual memory 
space and the VM’s system memory is required in order to correctly (and safely) 
manipulate that memory during introspection.  
Also, it is important for an appropriate amount of research to be conducted to ensure 
models being implemented, such as CPU temperature, are able to accurately reflect the 
actual state of the bare metal machine, in both general curve of the values and accuracy of 
those values.   
C. FUTURE WORK 
In this section, we present potential future work that may augment or improve 
smokescreen’s mitigation techniques as well as for high-fidelity hypervisors overall. 
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1. Process Injection 
At the present time, DRAKVUF is limited in how it can allow manipulation of 
memory during VM introspection. While manipulation is possible, it can only occur when 
system calls are executed and trapped through LibVMI. However, a future capability of the 
system under development called Process Injection could enable plugins (like 
smokescreen) to replace the contents of a process’s memory space with that of a different 
process which exists outside the guest VM. Once this capability has been implemented, 
smokescreen will act as a natural building block, where our modified programs are able to 
exist outside the guest VM and remove the requirement of having the modified programs 
present within the guest VM. This would eliminate the file system artifacts, in particular 
the modified programs, that were introduced by smokescreen’s current implementation.    
2. Mitigation of Other Types of Artifacts 
Another limitation of smokescreen is that it is only designed to mitigate device and 
capability artifacts that are present in common programs found within virtual machines. As 
described earlier, there are other types of artifacts, such as service, process, and file system 
artifacts, and random access memory artifacts. A system implemented to be an HFH will 
ultimately need to include mitigations for all these other types of artifacts.  
3. Additional Characteristics of High-Fidelity Hypervisors 
As described in Chapter I, Ingraham et al. [1] initially described five categories of 
characteristics of HFHs: artifacts, behavior, performance, security, and functionality. 
Smokescreen’s mitigations are focused on increasing the overall fidelity of a hypervisor’s 
characteristics with regards to artifacts. The other four categories will also require 
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